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 HAS  TRUMP’S  BRAND  OF  POPULISM  AFFECTED  INTERNATIONAL  
BUSINESS?  
This  study  aims  to  determine  whether  Donald  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  has  had  a  negative  
impact  on  international  business.  Trump  is  known  as  a  populist  who  carries  out  protectionist  
measures   and   classical   economic   theory   tells   us   that   protectionism   negatively   affects  
international  business.  In  view  of  that,  the  hypothesis  of  this  work  is  that  Trump  has  been  bad  
for  international  business.  A  literature  review  of  the  impact  of  Trump’s  policies  indicates  that  
he  has  provoked  several  trade  wars  and  while  a  few  domestic  companies  have  benefited  from  
it,  the  impact  both  on  US  economy  and  on  international  business  has  been  negative.  This  has  
been  the  case  because  his  policies  create  uncertainty.      
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¿HA   AFECTADO   EL   POPULISMO   DE   TRUMP   EL   MUNDO   DE   LA  
EMPRESA  INTERNACIONAL?  
Este   estudio   pretende   determinar   si   el   populismo   de  Donald   Trump   ha   tenido   un   impacto  
negativo  en  el  mundo  de  la  empresa  internacional.  Trump  es  conocido  como  un  populista  que  
lleva   a   cabo   medidas   proteccionistas   y   la   teoría   económica   clásica   demuestra   que   el  
proteccionismo  afecta  negativamente  al  mundo  de  la  empresa  internacional.  En  vista  de  esto,  
la  hipótesis  de  este   trabajo  es  que  Trump  ha  sido  malo  para   la  empresa   internacional.  Un  
análisis  de  publicaciones  sobre  el  impacto  de  las  políticas  de  Trump  indica  que  ha  provocado  
varias  guerras  comerciales  y  que,  mientras  algunas  empresas  nacionales  se  han  beneficiado  
de  ello,  el  impacto  tanto  en  la  economía  estadounidense  como  en  el  mundo  de  la  empresa  
internacional  ha  sido  negativo.  Esto  se  ha  debido  a  que  sus  políticas  crean  incertidumbre.  
Palabras   clave:   Empresa   internacional,   populismo,   proteccionismo,   comercio,   inversión,  
guerra  comercial
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Over  the  latest  years,  an  outstanding  political  phenomenon  has  occurred  all  over  the  world,  
but  mostly   in   the  Western   countries:   the   increase   of   populist   parties,   in   particular   far-­right  
parties.  The  best  example  of  this  increase  of  far-­right  populism  in  Europe  is  probably  Brexit,  in  
the  United  Kingdom.  On  June  23,  2016,  51.9%  of  the  British  voted  in  favor  of  UK  going  out  of  
the  European  Union   (EU)   after   a   campaign  based  on   identity   politics.  Yet,   the  world   best-­
known  example  is  probably  Trump  reaching  the  Presidency  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  
January  2017.    
These  events  are  expected  to  have  an  impact  on  international  business  since  one  of  the  key  
elements  of  the  far-­right  populism  is  closed  borders  and  all  political  actions  that  imply  isolation  
in  terms  of  closing  borders  to  other  countries  are  expected  to  have  (following  the  neoliberal  
economic  paradigm)  negative  direct  and  indirect  effects  on  trade  and  investments.  This  is  an  
assumption  that  it  is  generally  made  and  I  am  going  to  analyze  if  that  has  been  true  in  Trump’s  
case.  Has  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  had  a  negative  impact  on  international  business?  
In  order  to  answer  this  question,  this  work  is  structured  in  five  chapters.  In  the  first  chapter,  the  
main  concepts  are  defined:  what  is  considered  as  populism,  what  is  international  business  and  
the  impact  that  populism  is  expected  to  have  on  international  business.  In  the  second  chapter,  
I  define  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  stating  the  main  ideas  of  his  populism  and,  in  specific,  what  
his  trade  and  investments  policy  consists  in.  The  third  chapter  then  describes  the  methodology  
followed  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  
international  business.  The  chapter  discusses  how  to  measure  the  impact  of  Trump’s  policies  
on   international  business  and  when   the  hypothesis   is   to  be  considered   rejected.  Chapter  4  
presents  the  results  and  chapter  5  concludes  the  research.  
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1.   INTERNATIONAL  BUSINESS  AND  POPULISM  
The  objective  of   this  chapter   is   to  establish   the   relationship  existing  between  populism  and  
international  business.  The  chapter  is  structured  in  four  sections.  In  the  first  section,  there  is  
an  explanation  of  what  is  understood  as  international  business.  For  the  second  section,  the  
term  of  populism  is  defined  and  it  is  given  a  hint  of  its  history.  In  the  third  one,  it  is  analyzed  if  
there  is  any  relationship  between  both  terms  and  if  so,  what  are  the  links  between  them.  Finally,  
in  the  last  section  the  chapter  is  concluded.    
1.1.  International  business  
In  English  language,  the  term  ‘international  business’  is  very  ambiguous.  This  term  is  generally  
used  in  two  different  ways:  as  a  synonym  of  enterprise  or  as  related  to  the  activity  of  trade  and  
investment.  When  talking  about  international  business  in  regard  to  enterprises,  the  term  mostly  
refers   to   multinational   firms.   A  multinational   enterprise   can   be   considered   as   “a   company  
controlling  income-­generating  assets  in  at  least  two  different  countries”  (Colli,  2016,  p.  1).  It  
involves  every  kind  of  economic  activity  developed  in  a  different  country  than  the  country  in  
which  the  company  is  based.  Barba  Navaretti  and  Venables  (2006)  define  multinationals  also  
as   “firms   that   own  a   significant   equity   share  of   another   company,   henceforth   subsidiary  or  
affiliate,  operating  in  a  foreign  country”  (p.  2).    
International  businesses  are   frequently  assumed  to  be   large  companies,  whether   in  size  of  
sales,  proportion  of  market  value  or  even  number  of  employees.  Most  of  multinationals  are  
indeed  large  companies.  Global  Justice  Now  (2018)  shows  that  sixty-­nine  out  of  the  top-­100  
economic  entities,  in  terms  of  2017  revenue,  are  multinational  corporations.  Nonetheless,  not  
all   international  businesses  are   large  ones.  Nowadays,   it   is  very  common  to  see  small  and  
medium  enterprises   (SMEs),   going   into   an   internationalization   stage.  A  growing  amount   of  
SMEs,  family-­owned  or  individually  owned,  invest  nowadays  abroad  and  are  characterized  for  
being:  
Much   smaller   than   the   giant   global   companies   in   the   top   rankings,   they   also   cross   their  
respective   national   borders   and   operate   production   facilities   abroad,   thanks   to   a   number   of  
favourable   conditions   which   allow   them   to   act   globally   with   a   relatively   reduced   financial  
organisational  and  managerial  effort  (Colli,  2016,  p.  1).  
Taking  into  account  that  globalization  is  defined  as  “the  rapidly  growing  interpenetration  and  
interdependence   of   countries   worldwide   through   increasing   border   transactions   in   goods,  
services   and   capital   and   through   the  more   rapid   diffusion   of   technology”   (van   Verhaegen,  
2012,  p.  240);;  in  a  world  in  which  this  has  become  such  a  key  component  of  our  everyday  life,  
businesses  are  more  likely  to  succeed  if  they  are  internationalized.  
Regarding   the   other   interpretation   of   international   business,   the   one   related   to   trade   and  
investment,   it   refers  both  to  the  export  and  import  of  goods  and  services  to/from  a  different  
country   (trade)  and  may   involve   foreign   investments,  particularly   foreign  direct   investments  
(FDI).  Foreign  direct  investment  can  be  defined  as  follows:  
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Foreign  direct  investment  reflects  the  objective  of  establishing  a  lasting  interest  by  a  resident  
entity   in  one  economy   (direct   investor)   in  an  enterprise   (direct   investment  enterprise)   that   is  
resident   in  an  economy  other  than  that  of   the  direct   investor.  The  lasting   interest   implies  the  
existence   of   a   long-­term   relationship   between   the   direct   investor   and   the   direct   investment  
enterprise,  and  a  significant  degree  of  influence  on  the  management  of  the  enterprise  (OECD,  
2008,  p.  48).  
When   applying   the   definition   to   business,   an   FDI   is   given   when   the   direct   investor,   the  
enterprise  of  the  home  country,  acquires  ten  percent  or  more  of  the  ordinary  shares  or  voting  
power   of   an   enterprise   abroad,   the   one   in   the   host   country   (IMF,   2003).   This   ten   percent  
represents  a  sufficient  segment  of  voting  power  for  the  direct  investor  to  have  influence  in  the  
management  of  the  enterprise.  Within  the  framework  of  direct  investment,  the  OECD  (2008)  
differentiates  three  types  of  enterprises:  a  subsidiary,  in  which  the  investing  enterprise  holds  
of  more  than  fifty  percent  of  the  voting  power;;  an  associate,  the  direct  investor  has  control  over  
at  least  a  ten  percent  of  the  voting  power  but  no  more  than  fifty  of  it;;  and  fellow  enterprises,  
where  no  enterprise  has  enough  or  any  voting  power  in  each  other  to  the  extent  of  implying  
FDI  influence,  yet  they  have  a  common  parent.  
This   research   understands   international   business   both   from   an   enterprise   perspective   and  
from  a  trade  and  investment  one.  It  considers  that  trade  and  investment  are  the  result  of  the  
international   operations   of   enterprises   and   therefore   that   changes   in   trade   and   investment  
indicate  changes  in  international  business.  
Rugman   and   Brewer   (2003)   affirm   that   modern   multinational   is   not   a   “post-­World   War   II  
phenomenon”  (p.  11)  and  that  there  have  always  been  essential  differences  from  one  home  
country  to  the  next   in  the  evolution  of  multinational  enterprise.  Moreover,  each  host  country  
has  had  a  different  way  of  adapting  to  multinational  enterprises’  contributions.  Over  the  course  
of   history,   there   have   been   problems   of   consistency   in   the  measurement   of   FDI,   and   the  
emphasis  on  studying  multinationals  has  been  on  manufacturing  multinationals  while  service-­
sector  multinationals  are  still  to  be  explored.  
In  the  case  of  the  United  States  (US),  Wilkins’  studies  determined  that  the  internationalization  
of  the  American  businesses  started  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  a  large  segment  
on  the  history  of  foreign  investments  in  the  US  came  from  non-­US  multinationals  (as  explained  
in  Rugman  and  Brewer,  2003).  A  study  of   the  history  of   the  American  enterprise  made   the  
following  point  with  regard  to  the  former  American  multinational:  
The   traditional  American  model  of  multinational  enterprise   that  was  characterized  by   foreign  
direct  investment  (FDI)  aiming  at  exploiting  firm-­specific  capabilities  developed  at  home  and  a  
gradual   country-­by-­country   approach   of   internationalization,   dominated   the   global   economy  
during  much  of  the  post-­World  War  II  period  (Guillén  &  García-­Canal,  2009,  p.  23).    
When  American  multinationals  were   the  main  ones   in   the  market  of   international  business,  
they  were  “bigger  than  their  purely  domestic  competitors  and  enjoyed  larger  market  shares,  
more   likely   to   be   found   in   industries   where   competition   is   highly   imperfect   and   based   on  
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product  differentiation,  and  rewarded  by  smaller  year-­to-­year  fluctuations  in  their  consolidated  
earnings”  (Bergsten  et  al.,  1978,  p.  260).  
To   recapitulate,   there   are   two   different   ways   of   understanding   the   term   of   international  
business.  On  the  one  hand,  it  refers  to  any  company  controlling  income-­generating  assets  in  
at  least  two  different  countries.  This  category  includes  all  types  of  enterprises  that  are  investing  
abroad:  multinationals,  SMEs,  family-­owned  or   individually  owned  businesses.  On  the  other  
hand,  international  business  alludes  also  to  both  trade  and  non-­domestic  investments  (FDI),  
those  companies   that   invest   in  others  of   a  different   country.  Since   these   two  definitions  of  
international   business   are   not   incompatible,   this   research   understands   that   international  
business  is  reflected  both  in  the  number  of  enterprises  having  international  operations  and  to  
trade   FDI   indicators.   Last   fact   to   keep   in   mind   is   that   the   US   business   started   its  
internationalization  at  the  end  of  the  XIX  century.  
1.2.  Populism  
The  term  ‘populism’  is  one  of  the  most  media-­used  concepts  nowadays,  but  still  there  are  many  
interpretations  concerning  its  definition.  In  the  latest  literature,  the  concept  of  ‘populism’  has  
been  characterized  by  emotionally-­charged  political  appeals  to  addressing  crises.  While  some  
authors   distinguish   between   right   and   left-­wing   populism,   scholars   agree   that   both   share  
common   characteristics:   anti-­elitism,   anti-­pluralism,   direct   representation   and   protectionism  
(Stoker,  2019;;  Brubaker,  2017;;  Müller,  2017;;  Mudde  and  Kaltwasser,  2017;;  Urbinati,  2014).  
“Anti-­elitism”  represents  the  belief  populists  have  concerning  the  difference  of  social  classes.  
They  believe  there  is  a  privileged  elite  that  does  not  deserve  to  be  above  the  ordinary  citizens.  
In   fact,   they  defend   that  ordinary  citizens  should  prevail  over   the  criticized  elites.  Populists  
consider  there  is  a  usurpation  by  the  elite  of  the  people’s  democratic  control.  Populism  is  based  
on  “the  distinction  between  a  pure  and  sovereign  people,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  corrupt  and  
unresponsive  political  elite  on  the  other,  and  the  moral  primacy  of  the  former  over  the  latter”  
(Stoker,  2019,  p.  8).  The  so  called   ‘Us’  versus   ‘Them’  politics  depicts  on  a   large  extent   the  
populist   point   of   view,   in  which   ‘Us’   represents   ‘the  people’,   the  ordinary   citizens,  whereas  
‘Them’  refers  to  the  elite  classes  that  benefit  from  privileges  that  ‘the  people’  cannot.  This  leads  
to  an  “anti-­intellectual”  communication  style.  The  populist  style  devalues  in  a  performative  way  
the   complexity   of   speech   “through   rhetorical   practices   of   simplicity,   directness,   often  
accompanied  by  an  explicit   anti-­intellectualism   (…)   that   valorizes  common  sense  and   first-­
hand  experience  over  abstract  and  experience-­distant  forms  of  knowledge”  (Brubaker,  2017,  
p.   367).   In   populism,   it   is   also   very   important   and   taken   into   account  what   is   called   “body  
language”,  embodied  ways  of  doing  and  being  enacted  in  the  populist  oratory.  
Populists  also  stand  up  for  “anti-­pluralism”,  which  means  that   they  recognize  only  a  type  of  
society.  They  do  not  support  diversity  among  citizens  and  “rely  on  the  myth  that  there  is  an  
authentic,  homogeneous  ‘people’  whose  values  and  interests  they  understand”  (Stoker,  2019,  
p.  8).  Supporters  of  populism  view  opponents  as  the  real  enemies  of  the  people  and  often  tend  
to  demonize  them  in  the  political  debate.  It  is  linked  to  a  defense  of  “majoritarianism”,  which  is  
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defined   as   the   “assertion   of   the   interests,   rights,   and   will   of   the   majority   against   those   of  
minorities”  (Brubaker,  2017,  p.  365).    
The  third  characteristic  of  populism:  the  element  of  direct  representation,  involves  what  some  
call   “narcissism”.   It   implies   “anti-­institutionalism”,   that   is,   the   distrust   of   populists   towards  
intermediary   institutions   that   interfere   in   the   relationship  between   leader  and  supporters.   In  
populism,  the  leader  is  a  very  important  figure,  as  it  has  to  represent  and  express  what  people  
want   and   believe.   Urbinati   states   that   “intermediary   institutions   such   as   parliament,   non-­
governmental  organisations  or  the  media  that  threaten  this  direct  representation”  (as  cited  in  
Stoker,  2019)  of  the  leader  to  the  people,  are  a  focus  for  criticism  or  control.  This  so-­called  
direct  representation  finds  its  essence  in  direct  communication  with  the  people  through  the  TV  
and  social  media.  There  is  a  “tendency  to  dismiss  others  as  sources  of  fake  news  or  speaking  
for  special  interests  rather  than  the  people.  The  populist  leader  claims  to  speak  directly  for  and  
to  the  people”  (Stoker,  2019,  p.  8).  
Finally,  “protectionism”  comes  in  three  forms:  economic,  securitary  and  cultural.  The  first  is  to  
face  the  foreign  threat  to  domestic  producers,  workers  and  debtors;;  the  second  to  face  threats  
arisen   from   terrorism  and  crime;;  and   the   third,   to  protect   the   familiar   life  environment   from  
outsiders  (who  differ  in  cultural  issues  such  as  religion  or  language,  among  others)  (Brubaker,  
2017).  The  message  is  always  the  same:  the  people  will  be  protected  from  the  others  (either  
the  domestic  elite  or  foreigners).  
Even  though  populism  is  frequently  seen  as  a  right-­wing  ideological  movement,  it  is  not  always  
this  way.  In  fact,  within  the  examples  mentioned  by  Brubaker  (2017)  of  contemporary  populists,  
we   can   find,   on   the   one   hand,   political   figures   of   left-­wing   populism   such   as   Jean-­Luc  
Mélenchon  in  France,  Syriza  in  Greece,  Jeremy  Corbyn  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Bernie  
Sanders   in   the  US,  but  also  Podemos  movement   in  Spain.  On   the  other  hand,   there   is   the  
right-­wing  populism,  with  politicians  leading  the  movement  such  as  Norbert  Hofer  in  Austria,  
Marine  Le  Pen   in  France,  Geert  Wilders   in   the  Netherlands  and  Donald  Trump   in   the  US,  
including  UK  Independent  Party  movement  too.  In  Italy,  populists  from  both  sides  have  been  
able  to   form  a  governing  coalition.  The  Five  Star  Movement  (FSM)  stands  up  for  more   left-­
wing  views,  for  instance,  same-­sex  marriage  and  a  strong  environmental  agenda,  whereas  the  
Lega  Nord  defends  its  ideology  from  a  right-­wing  point  of  view,  being  this  anti-­European  and  
xenophobic,  among  others.  In  the  European  Union,  all  populist  movements  have  a  degree  of  
Euroscepticism  (the  European  Union  is  thought  as  an  unnecessary  and  harmful  institution  for  
European  countries),  although  left  wing  populists  tend  to  have  a  less  radical  view  of  that.  
To  sum  up,  even  though  left-­wing  and  right-­wing  populism  may  be  considered  different,  they  
have  several  characteristics   in  common,  of  which   the   following  ones  stand  out:  anti-­elitism,  
anti-­pluralism,  direct   representation  and  protectionism.  Anti-­elitism  represents   the  populists’  
belief  of  a  usurpation  by  the  privileged  elite  of  the  people’s  democratic  control,  whereas  anti-­
pluralism  stands  for  an  only  type  of  ‘people’  whose  values  and  interests  populists  understand.  
Direct  representation  symbolizes  the  rejection  populists  have  to  any  kind  of  institution  or  media  
that   can  meddle   in   the   relationship   that   the   populist   leader   has  with   their   supporters,   and  
 7  
protectionism  includes  facing  the  economic  threat  to  domestic  producers,  workers  and  debtors  
presented  by  foreigners.  
1.3.  Links  between  international  business  and  populism  
In  order  to  analyze  whether  Trump  has  affected  international  business  or  not,  it   is  crucial  to  
explain  the  link  between  populism  and  international  business.  When  searching  for  articles  that  
connected   both   topics,   I   looked   into   the   academic   databases   of  Web   of   Science,   Google  
Scholar,  and  Cercabib  (UB  Database),  but,  surprisingly,  none  of  them  had  any  article  related  
to  this.  The  fact  of  not  finding  any  result  made  me  consider  that  the  type  of  relationship  between  
international  business  and  populism  may  not  be  direct,  but  an  indirect  one.  
When   looking   into   the  definition   of   populism,  we   cannot   find  any   characteristic   referring   to  
international  business  specifically.  Still,  one  of  the  main  features  of  populism  is  the  economic  
protectionism,   also   known   as   trade   protectionism,   whose  main   idea   consists   in   protecting  
domestic  producers,  workers  and  debtors  from  the  foreign  ones  that  are  seen  as  a  real  threat.  
Abboushi   (2010)   defines   several   approaches   that   are   followed   in   order   to   perform   trade  
protectionism:  increasing  prices  of  imported  goods,  by  applying  tariffs  and  quotas  on  imports;;  
restricting  access  of  foreign  producers  to  the  domestic  market,  by  implementing  quotas  and  
harder  regulations  on  imports  or  by  controlling  currency  and  manipulating  exchange  rates;;  and  
reducing  costs   for  domestic  producers,  by  offering   them  subsidies  and  controlling  currency  
and   manipulating   exchange   rates.   Since   any   of   these   barriers   would   affect   trade   and  
investment,  they  would  consequently  also  affect  international  business  decisions.  
Several   studies   point   in   this   direction.   The   OECD   in   1985   (as   cited   in   Abboushi,   2010)  
researched  the  effects  of  protectionism  in  several  countries’  manufacturing  industries  finding  
that  there  was  stifled  economic  growth  and  depressed  investment  due  to  increases  in  domestic  
prices,  and  that  a  fall  in  imports  simultaneously  implied  a  fall  in  exports.  The  study  by  Jean  and  
Reshef  (2017)  on  the  consequences  of  protectionism  in  general  also  concludes  that  it  has  a  
negative  effect   in  business.   In   the   first  place,   import   tariffs  and  quotas  can  adversely  affect  
domestic   producers   in   the   case   they   use   imported   intermediate   goods.   Secondly,   export  
markets  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  protectionist  measures,  which  would  result  in  depressing  
demand   and   thus,   profitability   too.  Regarding   effects   of   protectionism  on   investments,   it   is  
crucial   to   keep   in   mind   the   importance   of   exchange   rates.   Protectionist   countries   tend   to  
manipulate   exchange   rates,   as   mentioned   above,   which   can   distort   factors   such   as  
“international   capital   flows,   cross-­border   investments   or   differences   in   forward-­looking  
expectations”   (Jean  &  Reshef,  2017,  p.  6).  Lastly,   the  research  claims   that   in  a  situation   in  
which  a  country   follows  trade  protectionist  measures,   its   trade  partners  could   increase  also  
their   own   level   of   trade   protection   in   response,   and   such   trade   war   could   result   into   an  
international  trade  war  that  could  get  out  of  control.  On  a  very  general  level,  it  would  increase  
inflation,  due  to  increase  on  prices  of  imports,  making  central  banks  to  raise  interest  rates.  This  
would  make  stock  markets  to  decline,  uncertainty  would  grow  and  it  all  would  result  into  in  an  
increased  cost  of  debt  and  a  large  drop  on  investment  (Jean  &  Reshef,  2017).  
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To  sum  up,  populism  is  expected  to  negatively  affect  international  business.  While  the  latter  
implies   exchanges   in   terms   of   trade   and   foreign   investments,   the   former   promotes  
protectionism.   Since   protectionism   is   expected   to   have   a   negative   impact   on   international  
business,  then  populism  indirectly  affects  international  business.  
1.4.  Conclusion  
In  order  to  develop  the  principle  objective  of  this  paper,  which  is  to  determine  whether  Trump’s  
populism   has   had   an   impact   on   international   business,   it   is   essential   to   establish   the  
connection  between  international  business  and  populism.  The  term  international  business  is  
understood  as  both  multinationals  and   trade,   representing  commercial  exchanges  of  goods  
and  services,  and  investments,  specifically  FDI.  In  regards  to  populism,  it  is  characterized  not  
only  by  anti-­elitism,  anti-­pluralism  and  direct  representation  but  also  by  protectionism.  Since  
protectionism,   or   economic   policy-­making   based   on   protecting   the   domestic   market,   is  
expected   to   negatively   affect   international   business,   then   populism   is   also   expected   to  
negatively  affect  international  business.  
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2.   TRUMP’S  BRAND  OF  POPULISM  
This  chapter  has  the  main  goal  of  defining  Trump’s  brand  of  populism.  It  is  divided  into  four  
sections.  The  first  section  provides  an  overview  of  populism  in  the  US  and  the  second  focuses  
on  the  one  developed  by  the  current  US  President  Mr.  Donald  Trump.  The  third  section  studies  
the   protectionism   of   Trump   based   on   an   “America   first”   platform,   and   finally,   there   is   the  
conclusion  for  the  chapter.  
2.1.  Populism  in  the  US  
Ruckno  (2017)  claims  that  the  populist  movement  was  born  in  America  in  the  late  1880s.  It  
started  as  a  claim  of  an  economic  nature  by  Southern  and  Midwestern  farmers  of  the  US.  The  
main   cause   of   this  movement   originates   in   the   period   in   which   cotton   prices   in   the   South  
dropped  to  a  very  great  extent  and  a  huge  drought  affected  the  plateau  of  the  Great  Plains.  
That  situation  generated  a  problem  in  farmers’  pockets,  as  they  had  to  face  financial  difficulties.  
At   the   same   time,   bankers   decided   to   take  advantage  of   them   to   have  greater   profits   and  
increased  lending  rates  up  to  the  point  of  being  exorbitant.  Naturally,  farmers  were  not  fond  of  
bankers’  actions  and  came  resent  to  them.  Another  event  that  occurred  and  did  not  help   in  
diminishing   farmers’   displeasure   was   the   excessiveness   of   prices   charged   by   the   railroad  
barons.  All  this  resulted  in  the  creation  of  the  People’s  Party  whose  members  were  known  as  
the  Populists.  The  principal   ideas  this  political  party  defended  were  the  abolition  of  national  
banks,  a  graduated  income  tax  in  which  the  tax  rate  would  rise  as  income  levels  rose,  direct  
election  of  senators,  an  eight-­hour  workday,  and  government  control  of  all  utilities   including  
railroads.  They  also  supported  an  anti-­elitist  ideology.  
Later  on,   the  Populists  were  divided   into   two:   fusionists  and   the  already  existing  Populists.  
Fusionists  represented  the  part  of  the  movement  that  wanted  a  merger  with  the  Democrats,  
while  former  Populists  preferred  to  stay  as  the  People’s  Party.  At  the  end,  fusionists  prevailed,  
and   the  People’s  Party   faded  away  entirely   in  1896,  at   the   time  when   fusionists  supported  
Democrat   William   Jennings   Bryan   in   his   presidential   election   of   that   year.   Nevertheless,  
populism  never  vanished  entirely.  During  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  it  came  back  
to  represent  the  people.  At  that  moment,  liberals  were  no  longer  the  populists  but  the  new  elite,  
and  the  populists  emerged  from  the  right  side  of  American  politics.  This  new  populism  was  
instigated   by   two   important   figures:   Joseph   McCarthy,   who   “launched   a   crusade   against  
Communism  that  targeted  left-­leaning  academics,  the  Ivy  League  educated,  and  Hollywood  
actors  and  producers”  (Ruckno,  2017,  para.  7);;  and  George  Wallace,  who  put  all  the  blame  on  
corporate  bureaucrats  and  liberals  for  the  poor  economic  and  political  situation  at  that  moment  
in   the   US.   Basically,   these   new   representative   figures   of   populism   challenged   the   way   of  
governance   in  democracies  at   that   time  and  called   for  a  democracy   that  gave  people  what  
they  actually  wanted.  From  that  moment  onwards,  the  Right  in  the  US  has  kept  a  hint  of  anti-­
elitism  in  its  populism.  
Kazin  (2016)  defines  two  types  of  populism  throughout  the  history  of  the  US  that  can  be  related  
somehow  with  all  the  events  connected  with  the  development  of  the  populist  movement.  One  
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is  against  corporate  elites  and  those  in  the  government  facilitating  them  to  reach  that  position.  
They  use   the  concept  of   “the  people”  with  no  kind  of  specificities  connected   to  ethnicity  or  
religion.  They  defend  the  so-­called  “civic  nationalism”,  an  idea  that  implies  “the  people  ruling”,  
hence  controlling  the  course  developed  by  local,  state  and  federal  governments  affecting  the  
people’s  life,  as  well  as  a  society  in  which  every  individual  has  the  same  rights  regarding  life,  
liberty  and  pursuit  of  happiness  and  free  of  discrimination  related   to  ethnicity,   religion,   race  
and  sexual  orientation  (Gerstle,  2015).  This  first  category  might  be  connected  with  the  initial  
conception  of  the  creation  of  the  populism,  which  was  based  on  the  fight  towards  the  elite  that  
had  more  privileges   than   the  actual   people   and  was  perceived  as  unfairness.  The   second  
category  of  American  populism  conceives  the  term  of  “the  people”  in  a  more  ethnically  tight  
way.  While  they  side  with  the  other  type  of  populists  by  being  against  elites  in  big  business  
and   government,   they   stand   up   for   the   so-­called   “racial   nationalism”,   an   understanding   of  
“America  in  ethnoracial  terms,  as  a  people  held  together  by  common  blood  and  skin  color  and  
by  an  inherited  fitness  for  self-­governments”  (Gerstle,  2017,  p.  4).  Hence,  this  kind  of  populism  
can  be  related   to   the  one   that  arose  during   the  second  half  of   the   twentieth  century,  which  
blamed  liberals,  communists  and  left-­leaning  academics,  among  other  figures,  for  the  former  
political  situation  at  that  moment.  Despite  having  their  differences,  both  types  of  populism  arise  
as  a  response  to  real  people’s  problems  and  complaints:  “an  economic  system  that  favors  the  
rich,   fear  of   losing   jobs   to  new   immigrants,   and  politicians  who  care  more  about   their   own  
advancement  than  well-­being  of  the  majority”  (Kazin,  2016,  p.  18).    
After  the  George  Wallace’s  “third-­party  presidential  bid  got  in  1968  a  13.6  percent  of  the  vote”  
(Ruckno,  2017,  para.  7),  populism  got  side-­lined  in  the  North  American  political  field  until  now.  
Following  Ruckno  (2017),   to  understand  why  populism  has  made  such  a  radical  comeback  
into  the  current  US  politics  of  the  21st  century,  it  is  crucial  to  date  back  to  the  time  of  the  2008  
financial  crisis.  The  well-­known  financial  crisis  that  started  one  decade  ago  and  affected  the  
whole  world  was   the   trigger   for   a   large   and   long-­standing   resentment   towards  Wall   Street  
agents   and   Washington   insiders,   which   had   a   big   influence   on   the   2016   US   presidential  
campaign.  Two  kind  of  populist  movements  emerged:  left-­wing  populism,  headed  up  by  Bernie  
Sanders,  and  Donald  Trump’s  right-­wing  populism.  The  first  adapted  the  framework  that  the  
People’s  Party  had  left  after  its  dissolution  in  the  twentieth  century.  Sanders  defended  a  point  
of  view  that  opposed  income  inequality  and  the  billionaire  class,  and  he  directly  addressed  his  
rhetoric  to  the  millennial  voters’  and  their  idealism.  Yet,  he  was  considered  as  too  Utopian  to  
be  realistic  and  Hillary  Clinton  became  the  Democrat   frontrunner.  That  was  not   the  case  of  
Trump  in  the  Republican  Party.  
2.2.  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  
Right  from  the  start,  Trump  developed  a  populist  speech  with  two  key  elements  in  it:  nativism  
and  anti-­elitism.  He  ran  on  an  ‘America  first’  platform  that  challenged  existing  Republican  Party  
views  on  issues  such  as  free  trade,  immigration,  and  American  intervention  in  foreign  affairs  
(Ruckno,  2017).  Additionally,  Donald  Trump  “added  a  big  dose  of  narcissism  and  turned  his  
movement   into   a   cult   of   personality”   (The   Week,   2015,   para.   6).   His   message   found   an  
audience  with  disaffected  voters  in  the  South  and  Midwest,  many  of  whom  have  grievances  
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that   closely   resemble   the   original   agenda   of   the  People’s  Party   (Ruckno,  2017).   As  Haley  
Barbour,  former  State  of  Mississippi  governor  and  current  member  of  the  Republican  Party,  
stated:  “Trump  is  the  manifestation  of  people’s  anger.  People  all  around  the  country  want  to  
send  Washington  the  bird  and  they  see  him  as  the  gigantic  middle  finger.”  (Kenneth,  2016,  p.  
267).  
One  of  the  most  significant  issues  regarding  Trump’s  populism  is  his  slogan  of  ‘Make  America  
Great  Again’.  Its  origin  dates  back  to  the  1980  presidential  campaign,  when  Ronald  Reagan,  
ex-­governor  of  the  State  of  California,  came  up  with  the  famous  quote  of  ‘Make  America  Great  
Again’.  Reagan  claimed  there  was  a  human  tragedy  at  that  moment  in  the  US  caused  by  Jimmy  
Carter,  who  was  the  president  of  the  US  at  that  moment,  and  he  spoke  that   jointly  “(…)  we  
can,  and  so  help  us  God  that  we  will,  make  America  great  again”  (Vavreck,  2015,  para.  10).  In  
the   case   of   Trump,   it   was   in   his   first   presidential   candidacy   speech,   through   which   he  
announced  he  was  running  for  president  of  the  US  in  2016,  where  he  suggested  that  he  was  
the  one  to  make  possible  to  take  back  America  to  its  good  times:  “Sadly,  the  American  dream  
is  dead.  But  if  I  get  elected  president  I  will  bring  it  back  bigger  and  better  and  stronger  than  
ever  before,  and  we  will  make  America  great  again”  (PBS  NewsHour,  2015).  
The   assumption   of   Donald   Trump   being   an   actual   populist   can   be   proved   through   a  
comparison  between  the  main  features  of  general  populism  and  the  way  in  which  Trump  has  
fulfilled  them.  In  the  first  place,  as  previously  explained,  populism  is  based  on  an  anger  towards  
the  elite  classes,  arguing  that  they  are  not  the  ones  that  should  prevail,  but  “the  people”.  From  
a  point  of  view  of  right-­wing  populists  such  as  Trump,  the  elite  is  favoring  inferior  and  weaker  
classes   such   immigrants   or   Islamists   (Judis,   2016).   Donald   Trump,   in   his   presidential  
campaign,   accused   those   who   were   then   in   the   government   of   being   “corrupt   politicians”,  
whom  he  referred  to  as  “our  very  stupid  leaders  in  Washington  DC”,  for,  in  Trump’s  opinion,  
allowing  illegal  immigrants  easy  entry,  …  allowing  “radical  Muslim  extremists  to  run  free  in  the  
Middle  East  and  eventually  find  their  way  into  the  US”  (Kenneth,  2016,  p.  26).  Moreover,  he  
“ran   a   campaign   advertisement   using   images   of  money   to  warn   against   rich   and   powerful  
forces   in  Washington”  (Michels,  2017,  p.  190).  He  also   favors  an   informal  and  easy  way  of  
communication  since  it  is  the  elite  that  uses  formal  or  sophisticated  style  to  feel  superior  to  the  
others.   A   study   of   Trump's   communication   style   developed   by   Ahmadian,   Azarshahi   and  
Paulhus   (2017)   showed   that   his   speeches   “reflected   substantially   more   grandiosity,   less  
formality,  and  greater  dynamics”  (p.  52),  and  that  makes  them  more  appealing  to  the  people  
that  most  of  the  time  make  use  of  the  informal  talk.  
A  second  element  of  the  populism  is  opposing  social  diversity  by  recognizing  only  a  type  of  
“people”  and  society.  Michels  (2017)  points  out  that  Donald  Trump  has  inflamed  ire  towards  
Hispanics,   Muslims,   African   Americans   and   Jews.   The   day   he   declared   his   presidential  
candidacy,  he  said  the  following  regarding  Mexico  and  Hispanics  in  general:  
When  do  we  beat  Mexico  at  the  border?  They're  laughing  at  us,  at  our  stupidity.  And  now  they  
are  beating  us  economically.  (…)  When  Mexico  sends  its  people,  they're  not  sending  their  best.  
(…)  They're  sending  people   that  have   lots  of  problems,  and   they're  bringing   those  problems  
with  us.  They're  bringing  drugs.  They're  bringing  crime.  Their  rapists.  And  some,  I  assume,  are  
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good  people.  (…)  They're  sending  us  not  the  right  people.  It’s  coming  from  more  than  Mexico.  
It’s  coming  from  all  over  South  and  Latin  America.  (…)  But  we  don’t  know,  because  we  have  no  
protection  and  we  have  no  competence,  we  don’t  know  what’s  happening.  And  it’s  got  to  stop.  
(PBS  NewsHour,  2015).    
Ever  since,  Trump  has  claimed  that  there  is  going  to  be  built  a  wall  on  the  border  of  US  and  
Mexico,  and  that  Mexican  government  will  be  the  responsible  of  paying  it  fully.  
He  did  not  only  attack  Hispanics  on  his  speech,  but  he  also  did  it  with  Middle  Eastern  people,  
accusing  them  all  of  being  Islamic  terrorists  and  claiming  that  they,  as  Americans,  should  have  
act  upon  them  for  some  time  now:  “Islamic  terrorism  is  eating  up  large  portions  of  the  Middle  
East,  they’ve  become  rich.  (…)  They  don’t  pay  interests  because  they  took  the  oil,  that  when  
we  left  Iraq,  I  said  we  should’ve  taken.  So  now  ISIS  has  the  oil,  and  what  they  don’t  have,  Iran  
has”   (PBS  NewsHour,   2015).  Regarding   Jewish,   one   controversial   issue   is   that   he  did  not  
mention  them  in  an  attempt  to  honor  the  dead  on  the  Holocaust  Remembrance  Day.  Donald  
Trump  still  uses  the  slogan  of  “America  first”,  even  though  he  knows  it  is  associated  to  pro-­
Nazi  ideas  of  the  1930s  (Michels,  2017).  He  also  makes  reference  to  the  ‘silent  majority’.  This  
term  was  coined  in  the  3  November  1969  speech  of  former  US  president  Richard  M.  Nixon,  in  
which  he  appealed  to  those  who  had  not  joined  the  demonstrations  against  Vietnam  War  at  
that  time.  He  said:  “and  so  tonight  –  to  you,  the  great  silent  majority  of  my  fellow  Americans  –  
I  ask  four  your  support”,  as  to  him,  there  was  a  majority  of  Americans  that  were  being  silenced  
by  those  against  the  Vietnam  War  in  the  media  (Thelen,  2017).  Trump  adopted  the  concept  of  
‘silent  majority’  and  said  in  one  of  his  speeches:  “The  silent  majority  is  back,  and  it’s  not  silent.  
It’s  aggressive”.  
As   explained   in   the   previous   chapter,   another   main   component   of   populism   is   that   direct  
representation  implies  a  closer  relationship  between  the  leader  and  their  voters,  without  any  
third   party   involved   such   as   institutions   or   the   media.   Donald   Trump   dismisses   and  
delegitimizes   any   news   coming   from   “left-­wing”   media,   CNN   and   MSBC   in   example,   by  
claiming  them  to  be  “fake  news”  or  favoring  some  specific  groups  rather  than  the  people   in  
general  (Stoker,  2019).  Trump’s  political  strategy,  conversely,  consists  in  using  “far-­right”  news  
agencies  and  talk  show  hosts,  such  as  Fox  News  or  Sean  Hannity,  “to  engage  voters  and  to  
consolidate  his  political  message”   (p.  8).  Nevertheless,  his  main  channel  of  communication  
with  his  supporters  is  Twitter.  His  Twitter  account  has  always  been  a  polemical  issue,  since  
there   is   where   he   openly   reveals   everything   he   thinks,   from   retweeting   postings   by   white  
supremacist   groups   (Michels,   2017)   to   verbally   attacking   people   on   his   tweets,   in   fact   the  
famous  newspaper  The  New  York  Times  “printed  a  list  of  all  the  289  people,  places  and  things  
the  Republican  candidate  had  insulted  on  Twitter  during  his  campaign”  (Winberg,  2019,  para.  
26).  This  narcissism  is  linked  to  anti-­institutionalism  or  a  distrust  of  intermediary  institutions.  
This  group  includes  governmental  institutions  and  non-­governmental  organizations,  although  
it   is   mainly   focused   on   governmental   ones,   and   more   specifically,   the   parliament.   Trump  
asserted   that   people   in   the   government   had   been  manipulated   by   those   that   had   the   real  
power.   He   expressed   openly:   “We   look   at   politicians   and   think:   this   one’s   owned   by   this  
millionaire.  That  one’s  owned  by  that  millionaire,  or  lobbyist,  or  special  group”  (Kenneth,  2016,  
p.  266).  
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Last  but  not  least,  Donald  Trump  opposes  globalization,  which  represents  “the  rise  of  multi  and  
transnational   corporations,   their   investors,   banks,   insurers,   and   the   managerial   and  
professional  classes  that  power  them”  (Gagnon  et  al.,  2018,  p.  ix),  as  it  expands  the  gap  there  
is  between  the  elite  and  the  ordinary  people.  He  also  stands  by  an  economic  protectionism  
which  focuses  mainly  on  the  interests  of  domestic  producers,  workers  and  debtors.    
To  sum  up,  Trump’s  brand  of  politics  is  populism.  His  politics  comply  with  all  the  characteristics  
of   populism:   anti-­elitism,   anti-­pluralism,   direct   representation   and   protectionism.   Since   the  
research   focuses   on   international   business,   in   the   next   section   it   is   the   protectionist  
characteristic  of  Trump’s  populism  that  is  explored  more  in  detail.  
2.3.  Trump’s  protectionism:  “America  first”  
As  Skonieczny  (2018)  contemplates  in  one  of  her  articles,  populism  can  be  conceived  as  a  
“narrative  where  the  core  ideas  of  it  are  used  in  story-­form  to  connect  a  subject  (the  people  
versus  the  elite)  theme  to  a  problem  (free  trade  that  destroys  the  middle  class)  and  a  resolution  
(protectionism)”  (p.  64).  Taking  into  account  this   illustration,  one  can  say  that  ever  since  he  
announced  himself   for   the  presidential  candidacy,  Donald  Trump  has   intended   to  carry  out  
measures   to   “make   America   great   again”   with   a   tendency   to   protectionism,   as   it   will   be  
demonstrated   in   the   following   paragraphs.   One   of   the  main   issues   to   keep   in  mind   when  
analyzing  US  policy  changes  is  that  even  if  the  change  is  applicable  on  a  national  scale,  as  
the  US   is  one  of   the  major  world  powers  due   to   its   size  and   large  connectivity,   any  policy  
change  regarding  trade  matters  will  have  a  worldwide  effect  (Ariff,  2018).  
During  the  course  of  the  presidential  campaign,  Donald  Trump  promised  his  audience  that  he  
would  carry  out  some  economic  measures  to  the  benefit  of  the  whole  country.  Since  he  entered  
into  the  government,  Trump  administration  has  focused  on  “creating  jobs  and  attracting  foreign  
direct  investment  (FDI)  in  the  domestic  market”  (Park,  2018,  p.  78)  through  both  a  reduction  of  
taxes  within  the  US  and  an  increase  on  tariffs  on  imports  and  a  reduction  of  taxes  on  exports.  
Park  (2018)  made  an  interesting  comparison  pointing  out  that  the  protectionism  of  the  US  has  
a   strong   similarity   to   the   economic   system   called   ‘mercantilism’.   According   to   Mercadal’s  
(2019)  definition  of  mercantilism,  former  countries  practicing  mercantilism  during  the  sixteenth  
and  eighteenth  centuries  had  the  objective  of  creating  “a  beneficial  balance  of  trade  with  two  
purposes:  attracting  commodities   like  gold  and  silver  and   increasing  domestic  employment”  
(para.  1),  which  resembles  to  the  previously  mentioned  main  focus  of  Trump  administration.  
Additionally,  mercantilism  has  an  understanding  of  the  world  trade  as  a  game  in  which  there  
are   winners   and   losers,   depending   on   their   trade   balances.   That   is   why   the   American  
government  perceives  that  its  role  is  crucial  in  its  trade  relations  with  big  world  powers  such  
as  Japan,  the  EU  or  China,  as  well  as  in  any  free  trade  agreement  the  US  participates,  such  
as  the  Trans-­Pacific  Partnership  (TPP)  and  the  new  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  
(named   USMCA).   Taking   into   account   “mercantilism’s   simplistic   analytical   framework”,  
President  Trump  took  many  trade-­related  decisions  explained  below  (Park,  2018,  p.  79).  
The  main  issue  with  these  intended  economic  measures  of  Trump  is  his  own  idea  of  the  causes  
of  US   trade  deficit.  While  most  economists  consider   that   “the  aggregate  US   trade  deficit   is  
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determined   by   broad   macroeconomic   forces,   notably   private   savings   and   investment,  
government  deficits,  and  the  exchange  rate  for  the  dollar,  rather  than  by  trading  conditions  with  
individual  countries”  (Hufbauer  &  Jung,  2016,  para.  7),  the  present  US  administration  claims  
that  US   trade  deficit  should  be   “solved”   through  new   trade  agreements.  Peter  Navarro  and  
Wilbur  Ross,  economic  advisors  in  Trump’s  presidential  campaign,  wrote  about  how  Donald  
Trump  would  deal  with  the  trade  deficit:  “Trump  proposes  eliminating  America’s  $500  billion  
trade   deficit   through   a   combination   of   increased   exports   and   reduced   imports”   (Navarro  &  
Ross,  2016,  p.  18).  As  shown  in  Table  1,  an  analysis  carried  out  by  the  US  Bureau  of  Economic  
Analysis  (included  in  Hufbauer  &  Jung,  2016)  of   the  previous  status  of  exports  and   imports  
balances  of  major  countries  with  the  US  showed  that  most  of  the  big  economic  powers  turned  
out  as  winners  of  trade  and  the  US  becomes  the  loser  of  it.  Because  of  that,  Trump  defends  
bilateral  trade  agreements  only  with  individual  countries  in  which  the  US  can  actually  benefit  
from  it  (Hufbauer  &  Jung,  2016).  
TABLE  1.  2015  US  GOODS  AND  SERVICES  TRADE    
BALANCES  WITH  MAJOR  COUNTRIES  
  
Source:  Reprinted  from  “US  Bilateral  Trade  Balances:  A  New  Guide  to  Trade  Policy?”  (2016)  
Regarding  trade  agreements,  Trump  promised  during  the  election  campaign  to  withdraw  from  
the  Trans-­Pacific  Partnership  agreement,  known  as  TPP   (VanGrasstek,  2017).  On   the  one  
hand,  Obama,  who  was  the  one  who  decided  the  US  would  participate  in  the  TPP,  presented  
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this  agreement  as  a  “pro-­globalization  opportunity  for  American  workers”,  although  his  rhetoric  
focused  on  businesses  and  encouraging  to  build  “elite  relationships  with  other  businesses  in  
foreign  cultures”  (Skonieczny,  2018,  p.  65-­66).  On  the  other  hand,  neither  Sanders  nor  Trump,  
both  populists  of  2016  presidential  election,  supported  Obama.  Trump  wrote  against  the  TPP  
in  the  USA  Today:    
The   great   American  middle   class   is   disappearing.  One   of   the   factors   driving   this   economic  
devastation   is   America’s   disastrous   trade   policies.   (…)   America’s   politicians  —beholden   to  
global   corporate   interests   who   profit   from   offshoring—   have   enabled   jobs   theft   in   every  
imaginable  way.   They   have   tolerated   foreign   trade   cheating  while   enacting   trade   deals   that  
encourage  companies  to  shift  production  overseas  (Trump,  2016,  para.  2,  3,  9).    
After  Donald  Trump  entered  into  the  government,  although  the  TPP  had  not  entered  into  force  
yet,  he  indeed  maintained  his  position  of  withdrawing  the  US  from  the  aforementioned  trade  
agreement  (O’Gorman  &  Stadnyk,  2017).  
Another  promise  Trump  made  during  his  election  campaign  regarding  trade  agreements  was  
a  renegotiation  of  the  clauses  of  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  or,  in  
the  worst  situation,  even  the  withdrawal  of  the  US  from  it  (O’Gorman  &  Stadnyk,  2017).  After  
several   years  of   negotiations,   the   three   countries   (the  United  States,  Mexico  and  Canada)  
have  reached  an  agreement.  They  have  agreed  on  a  new  trade  deal  called  USMCA,  which  
stands  for  United  States-­Mexico-­Canada  Agreement.  Although  the  original  NAFTA  remains  in  
effect,   there   is   intention   to   carry   out   a   smooth   transition   from   the  old   one   to   the  new  one.  
According   to   Trump’s   statement   found   in   the   official   website   of   USMCA,   it   is   a   new   trade  
agreement  that  “solves  the  many  deficiencies  and  mistakes  in  NAFTA,  greatly  opens  markets  
to  [US]  farmers  and  manufacturers,  reduces  trade  barriers  to  the  US  and  will  bring  all  three  
Great  Nations  together  in  competition  with  the  rest  of  the  world”  (as  cited  in  Office  of  the  United  
States  Trade  Representative,  2018).  
A  third  electoral  promise  of  Trump  regarded  China.  He  promised  to  raise  tariffs  on  all  Chinese  
products  and  to   force  the  Chinese  government   to  stop   its  unfair   trade  practices.  He  started  
raising  tariffs  to  Chinese  products  in  2018  and  since  then  a  trade  war  has  ensued  with  China  
retaliating  with  tariff  increases  to  each  new  increase  in  US  tariffs  towards  Chinese  products.  In  
several  occasions,   trade  measures   taken  during   this   trade  war  have  been  directed  towards  
specific  businesses,  such  as  ZTE   in  2018  and  Huawei  very   recently,   in  May  2019.  Despite  
several   rounds  of  negotiations,   the  governments  of  both  countries  have  yet  been  unable   to  
reach  an  agreement  (Bown  &  Zhang,  2019a).  
His  aggressive  trade  policy  has  also  affected  its  relations  with  Japan  and  the  European  Union.  
After  raising  tariffs  on  their  exports  of  steel  and  aluminum  in  2018,  he  is  now  menacing  to  raise  
tariffs  of  their  car  exports  to  the  US  unless  they  agree  on  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  United  
States  (Hufbauer  &  Lu,  2019).  Notwithstanding,  Donald  Trump  intends  to  negotiate  a  new  trade  
agreement  with  the  European  Union,  one  that  addresses  US  concerns  more  in-­depth  than  the  
Transatlantic  Trade  and  Investment  Partnership  (TTIP)  was.  Following  the  objectives  for  the  
US-­European   Union   Negotiations   report   released   in   January   2019,   US   claims   that   “U.S.  
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exporters   in   key   sectors   have   been   challenged   by  multiple   tariff   and   non-­tariff   barriers   for  
decades,   leading   to   chronic   U.S.   trade   imbalances   with   the   EU”   (Executive   Office   of   the  
President,  2019,  para.  2),  and  therefore  they  want  to  improve  their  trade  relations  and  make  it  
equal   for  both  sides.  Likewise,  Trump   is  willing   to  negotiate  a  US-­Japan  Trade  Agreement  
(USJTA)  due  to  the  importance  of  a  good  relationship  between  the  US  and  Japan  as  they  are  
“the  world’s  first  and  third  largest  economies,  respectively,  representing  about  30  percent  of  
global  Gross  Domestic   Product”   (Executive  Office   of   the   President,   2018,   para.   2).   These  
negotiations  have  been  proposed  in  an  attempt  to  satisfy  Japan  and  the  European  Union  to  
diffuse  political  tensions  and  prevent  possible  retaliation,  but  always  bearing  in  mind  what  is  
best  to  the  US  itself.    
Naturally,  as  one  might  have  expected,  new  variations  regarding  US  trade  policy  are  focused  
on   favoring,   firstly,   the  US,  and  after,   the   rest  of   the  countries.  As  Trump  spoke  more   than  
once,  his  intention  was  to  put  “America  first”,  and  his  economic  objectives  were  increasing  the  
growth  of  the  country  and  try  to  “bring  it  back  to  the  higher  growth  trend  or  higher  than  prevailed  
prior  to  the  2008-­2009  crisis”  (Salvatore,  2018,  p.  485).  
2.4.  Conclusion  
Donald  Trump  is  the  current  image  of  the  first  successful  right-­wing  politician  of  the  modern  
populist   movement.   He   has   known   how   to   be   heard   by   the   people,   and   though   being   a  
triumphant   figure   in   the   business   field,   he   has   been   able   to   take   his   place   in   the   field   of  
American  politics  with  an  anti-­elite  discourse.  Trump  fulfils  the  main  elements  to  apply  to  as  
leader  of  the  American  right-­wing  populism:  anti-­elitism,  anti-­pluralism,  direct  representation  
and  protectionism.  Interestingly,  as  businessman,  he  has  convinced  his  supporters  that  there  
is,   in   fact,  a  corrupt  elite   that  can  be   found   in   the  government,  whose  strings  are  pulled  by  
powerful  millionaires  of  the  business  world.  His  presidential  campaign  was  based  on  the  slogan  
“make  America  great  again”,  and  always  keeping  in  mind  that  America  is  first.  With  this  rhetoric,  
he  was  able  to  win  people’s  support  and  convinced  them  he  was  the  most  suitable  candidate  
for  the  US  presidency.  
Trump’s   populism   includes   trade   protectionism.   Donald   Trump   criticized  most   of   the   trade  
agreements  that  were  in  force  during  Obama’s  governance  and  promised  the  people  he  would  
change   them  or  even  withdraw   from  some  of   them  on   the  benefit  of   the  United  States.  As  
summarized  in  Table  2,  ever  since  he  became  president,  Trump  has  tried  to  negotiate  or  re-­
negotiate  bilateral  trade  agreements  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  US  gains  more  than  the  other  
country  from  the  deal.  He  has  also  provoked  a  trade  war  with  China  and  tensioned  its  relations  
with  its  traditional  allies  (Canada,  Mexico,  Japan  and  the  European  Union).  
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES TAKEN BY THE 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION PER COUNTRY1  
Intended  measure   Regions  involved  
Trump’s  reasons                      
for  this  measure  
Impact  of  this  
measure  








•   No  specific  reasons  
(political  nature  
reasons)2  
US  withdrawal  from  
TPP  agreement  
Renegotiation  of  the  





•   “Worst  trade  deal  ever”  
signed  by  the  US  
•   Trade  deficits  with  
Mexico  and  Canada  
proved  US  got  ripped-­
off  
•   Unfair  trade  practices  
by  its  partners  
•   Loss  of  millions  of  US  
manufacturing  firms  
and  American  jobs3  
Replacement  of  
NAFTA  with  a  new  
deal:  USMCA  (United  
States-­Mexico-­
Canada  Agreement)  
Imposition  of  tariffs  
and  other  measures    
to  prevent  unfair  trade  
practices  by  China  
China   •   Unfair  trade  practices  





•   Amount  too  large  of  
Chinese  imports  
China’s  retaliation  
through  tariff  increase  
and  tension  between  
nations  
Improvement  of  trade  




•   Trade  deficit  with  the  
European  Union5  
Invalidation  of  TTIP  
and  negotiations  over  
a  substitutive  new  
deal  
Development  of  fair  
FTA  with  Japan  
Japan   •   Harmed  US  exporters  
of  automobile,  
agriculture  and  services  
sectors  
•   Trade  imbalances  with  
Japan6  
Negotiation  of  USJTA  
                                                   
1  Information  based  on  chapter  2.3.  
2  Data  taken  from  “The  TPP:  Origins  and  Outcomes”  (Schott,  2018a).  
3  Reasons  explained  in  “The  United  States-­Mexico-­Canada  Agreement:  Overview  and  Outlook”  (Hufbauer  &  
Globerman,  2018)  
4  Quotation  from  article  “Free  Trade  Agreements  and  Globalisation:  In  the  Shadow  of  Brexit  and  Trump”  
(Melchior,  2018,  pp.  4-­5)  
5  Fact  taken  from  “United  States-­European  Union  Negotiations”  (Executive  Office  of  the  President  of  the  United  
States,  2019)  
6  Information  based  on  “United  States-­Japan  Trade  Agreement  (USJTA)  Negotiations”  (Executive  Office  of  the  
President  of  the  United  States,  2018)  
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3.  METHODOLOGY  
This  chapter  gives  an  outline  of  the  research  methodology  that  has  been  followed  to  test  the  
hypothesis   that   international   business   has   been   negatively   affected   by   Trump’s   brand   of  
populism.  This  chapter  is  structured  in  four  sections.  The  first  one  justifies  the  choice  of  both  
research  question  and  hypothesis,  whereas  the  second  one  explains  Trump’s  trade  war  and  
highlights  main  events   that  made  them  important   to  analyze.  The  third  section  explains   the  
process  of  testing  the  hypothesis  and  when  said  hypothesis  would  be  rejected,  and  the  final  
one  briefly  summarizes  the  methodology  followed  in  this  research  paper.  
3.1.  Justifying  the  research  question  and  hypothesis  
Nowadays,   every   decision   taken   at   a   national   level   is   probably   going   to   affect   the   other  
countries.   This   is   because   of   two   movements:   globalization   and   trade   liberalization.  
Globalization   interconnects   every   country   with   each   other   in   any   kind   of   field,   and   trade  
liberalization   does   it   in   the   specific   area   of   business.  What   is   true   is   that   there   are   some  
particular  countries  more  likely  to  affect  the  others,  of  which  one  of  them  is  the  US.  
Since  the  election  of  Donald  Trump  as  President  of  the  US,  his  trade  policy  has  been  in  the  
spotlight.  As  explained  in  chapter  2,  Trump  is  a  very  different  president  to  the  previous  ones  
because  of  his  way  of  acting  and  thoughts  of  his  own:  he  is  a  populist  businessman  but  defends  
many  protectionist  measures.  Donald  Trump  stands  by  the  idea  of  an  existing  corrupt  elite,  in  
this  case,   it   is   the  government   that   is  manipulated  by  powerful  millionaires  of   the  business  
world.  With  his  protectionist  slogan  of  “America  first”,  he  has  always  claimed  to  want  to  do  what  
is  best  for  America:  from  changing  or  withdrawing  from  most  of  the  free  trade  agreements  the  
US  participates  in,  to  trying  to  develop  bilateral  trade  agreements  with  individual  countries,  as  
he  considers  the  US  is  not  getting  as  benefitted  as  it  should  have  by  taking  part  in  these.  Trump  
is  a  right-­wing  politician  who  meets  the  main  criteria  of  populism:  anti-­elitism,  anti-­pluralism,  
direct   representation   and,   most   importantly   for   this   research,   protectionism.   As   chapter   1  
explains,  international  business  is  linked  to  both  trade  and  investment.  Since  protectionism  is  
a  characteristic  of  the  populism  and  protectionism  affects  trade  and  investment,  international  
business  is  indirectly  linked  to  populism.  
Thereby,  it  makes  sense  to  believe  that  Donald  Trump’s  government  has  had  effects  on  the  
business  field,  particularly  on  international  business.  This  paper  focuses  on  finding  out  if  this  
is   true,   therefore   the   research  question  of   this  study   is   the   following  one:  Has   international  
business  been  affected  by  Trump’s  brand  of  populism?  For  this  question,  and  according  to  the  
theoretical  framework  already  provided,  the  hypothesis  affirms  that  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  
has   had   a   negative   effect   on   international   business.   The  main   reason   to   argue   that   these  
effects   are   negative   is   because   protectionism,  way   of   economic   policy-­making   followed  by  
Trump,  is  perceived  as  harmful  for  the  economy  in  terms  of  international  impact  by  economic  
theory.   This,   in   combination   with   mercantilist   hints   in   Trump’s   thinking,   regarding   his  
conception  of  world  trade  as  a  game  in  which  there  are  winners  and  losers  depending  on  their  
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trade  balances,  states  the  main  reason  to  believe  international  business  has  been  negatively  
affected  by  Trump’s  populism.  
3.2.  Trump’s  trade  war  
As  it  has  been  previously  briefly  mentioned,  there  is  an  on-­going  trade  war  between  the  US  
and  China  that  started  in  half  2018  that  we  know  of,  but  it  is  definitely  not  the  only  trade  battle  
Donald  Trump  has  started  since  he  became  the  US  president.  According  to  an  article  of  PIIE  
written  by  Bown  and  Kolb  (2019)1,   there  are   five  different  current   trade  fights  within   the  big  
trade  war.  These  battles  are  not  usually  aimed  at  specific  nations,  as  it  may  be  thought,  they  
tend   to  be  directed   to   foreign  sectors  and   industries   that,  according   to   the  US  government,  
could  cause  injury  a  direct  negative  impact  to  the  North  American  ones.  Taking  trade  war  as  
“a  situation  in  which  countries  try  to  damage  each  other’s  trade,  typically  by  the  imposition  of  
tariffs  or  quota  restrictions”.  (Lexico.com  online  dictionary),2  the  five  trade  fights  may  each  be  
considered  a  separate  trade  war  since  they  all  started  with  Trump  menacing  to  raise  or  raising  
protectionist  measures  and  one  or  more  third  countries  retaliating.  
Firstly,  one  of  the  trade  wars  involves  solar  panel  and  washing  machine  industries.  At  the  end  
of   the   year   2017,   the   US   International   Trade   Commission   (USITC)   claimed   through   two  
different  statements  that  the  quantity  of  both  crystalline  silicon  photovoltaic  cells  and  residential  
washers  was  extremely  large,  injuring  domestic  industries.  The  USITC  recommended  Donald  
Trump   imposing   restrictions   on   imports   of   that   nature,   who   on   January   22,   2018   actually  
implemented  them  in  the  form  of  safeguard  tariffs.  These  tariffs  were  imposed  on  8.5  billion  
dollar   imported   solar   panels   and   1.8   billion   dollar   imports   of  washing  machines.     With   the  
imposition  of  these  tariffs,  China,  South  Korea  and  a  few  more  countries  ended  up  harmed.  
With  the  intention  of  mending  this  but  also  in  a  retaliatory  response,  on  April  17,  2018,  China  
applied   antidumping   duties   on   1   billion-­dollar   US   exports   of   sorghum   to   its   territory   in   the  
context  of  previous  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  investigations  of  this,  although  several  
months  later  Chinese  duties  were  lifted  after  negotiations  with  the  US  arguing  public’s  interest  
was  not  to  face  the  grain  sorghum  tariff  imposition.  Even  so,  both  South  Korea  and  China  filed  
WTO  disputes  against  US  solar  panels  and  washing  machines  tariffs.  
A  second  fight  taking  place  on  the  trade  battlefield  concerns  steel  and  aluminum  US  imports.  
On  April  20,  2017,  Donald  Trump  announced  an  investigation  of  possible  threats  that  steel  and  
aluminum  imports  could  cause  to  the  US  national  security,  whose  results  led  to,  on  March,  1,  
2018,  the  imposition  of   import  tariffs  on  about  a  third  of  US  steel   imports  and  45  percent  of  
aluminum   imports.  Whereas   the   European  Union,  members   of   NAFTA,   Brazil   and   several  
more  countries  were  exempt  from  the  tariffs,  on  April  2,  2018,  China,  whose  2.8  billion-­dollar  
exports  got  affected  by  the  tariff,  retaliated  by  applying  tariffs  on  US  exports  totaling  2.4  billion  
dollars.  Although  previously  exempted,  on  June  1,  2018  the  EU,  Canada  and  Mexico  stopped  
getting  benefitted  from  the  exemption  and  got  directly  affected  by  the  imposition  of  the  tariff.  In  
                                                   
1 Data  from  the  following  analysis  that  does  not  have  any  specific  citation  implies  that  has  been  taken  from  the  
article  “Trump’s  Trade  War  Timeline:  An  Up-­to-­Date  Guide”  (2019)  
2 “Trade  war”  dictionary  entry  (Lexico.com  online  dictionary,  n.d.)  
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light  of  the  foregoing,  these  countries  also  retaliated  by  targeting  12.8  billion-­dollar  US  exports  
in   2017   exports   value.   Moreover,   on   August   10,   2018,   Trump   decided   to   increase   tariffs  
imposed  on  Turkey  exports  to  the  US,  who  also  responded  in  a  retaliatory  manner.  In  the  most  
recent  event  of  this  battle,  US  has  lifted  steel  and  aluminum  tariffs  on  both  Mexico  and  Canada  
in  May  2019.  
A  third  trade  war  is  based  on  unfair  trade  practices  for  both  technology  and  intellectual  property  
(IP),  a  war  that  has  involved  China.  This  battle  started  on  August  18,  2017,  when  Donald  Trump  
asked  the  US  Trade  Representative  through  a  presidential  memorandum  to  consider  carrying  
out  a  national  security  investigation  of  China  in  regards  of  its  trade  actions,  practices,  laws  and  
policies  that  could  have  a  harmful  effect  on  America’s  intellectual  property  rights,  technology  
development  or   innovation.  With   the  development  of   this   investigation,   the  US  government  
concluded  that  China  was  actually  carrying  out  unfair  trade  practices  in  relation  to  intellectual  
property,  technology  transfer  and  innovation,  which  resulted  in  the  imposition  of  tariffs  from  the  
US  side  on  $46.2  billion-­dollar  Chinese  exports  to  the  US.  China,  as  it  was  expected,  retaliated  
in  the  same  way  and  applied  tariffs  on  106  US  exports  to  China,  most  of  them  coming  from  
transportation  and  vegetable  products  industries.  In  reaction  to  this,  the  US  counter-­retaliated  
and  increased  its  range  of  tariffs,  as  well  as  China,  subsequently,  did.  From  then  on,  this  trade  
war  has  become  an  endless  loop  of  applying  higher  and  higher  tariffs  on  each  other.  Up  to  
34.2  billion-­dollar  Chinese  machinery,  mechanical  appliances  and  electrical  equipment  exports  
have  been  subject  of  Trump’s  tariffs  (Bown,  2018).  Despite  the  efforts  of  negotiating  a  truce  in  
the  G-­20  summit  of  December  2018,  a  deal  was  never  reached  and  this  new  kind  of   “Cold  
War”  has  kept  going  on  since,  starting  to  get  out  of  control  and  to  have  far  more  impact  than  it  
was  supposed  to.  
As  previously  mentioned,  sometimes  operations  on  these  trade  wars  are  addressed  to  specific  
enterprises.   That   was   the   case   of   ZTE,   a   Chinese   telecommunications   and   networking  
equipment  enterprise  that  during  a  period  of  2018  was  banned  from  US  export  privileges.  In  
2017,   the   US   Department   of   Commerce   found   out   that   ZTE   had   been   illegally   trading  
telecommunications  equipment  to  Iran  and  North  Korea  and  misleading  the  US  government  
through   false  statements.  The  US  punished   them  by  means  of  monetary  penalties  and   the  
possibility  of  activating  a  suspended  denial  of  export  privileges  in  the  case  the  US  agreement  
was   not   met   by   ZTE.   In   April   16,   2018,   the   US   Department   of   Commerce   activated   the  
suspended  denial  order  against  ZTE  in  response  to  false  statements  during  the  probationary  
period  (U.S.  Commerce  Department,  2018).  Although  the  ban  was  lifted  in  July  13,  2018,  after  
ZTE  paid  the  pending  monetary  penalties,  this  action  largely  damaged  ZTE  production,  since  
“American  companies  are  estimated  to  provide  25  percent  to  30  percent  of  the  components  
used  in  ZTE’s  equipment”  (Stecklow  et  al.,  2018).    
Another   targeted   enterprise   in   this   trade   war   has   been   Huawei.   In  May   this   year,   the   US  
government  added  Huawei  to  the  Entity  List  since  the  Commerce  Department  declared  this  
enterprise  is  involved  in  activities  that  are  contrary  to  the  national  security  interests  of  the  US,  
specifically  developing  and  supplying  5G  telecoms  equipment.  From  Donald  Trump’s  point  of  
view,   Huawei   could   use   5G   network   to   install   a   hidden   layer   through   which   the   Chinese  
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government  would  control  worldwide  communications,   including  North  American  ones.  This  
addition   to   the   Entity   list   implies   that   any   intention   of   sale   or   transfer   from   an   American  
technology  to  Huawei  requires  a  license  that  could  be  denied  if  it  is  perceived  that  could  harm  
U.S.  national  security,  that  is,  fundamentally,  an  almost  total  blocked  access  to  US  technology  
for  Huawei  (U.S.  Commerce  Department,  2019).  
Another   trade  battle   that  Donald  Trump  has  started   involves  the  car   industry.  As  with  other  
products  before,  the  launch  of  a  national  security  investigation  on  May  23,  2018  was  approved  
to  find  out  the  economic  impact  of  imported  autos  and  parts  into  the  US,  and  a  rise  of  US  duties  
to  25  percent  on  all  autos  and  parts  imports  was  considered.  A  deal  was  reached  regarding  
the  effects  a   tariff  on  autos  could  have   to  Canada  and  Mexico,  and  with   the  signing  of   the  
USMCA,  they  got  assured  they  would  be  exempt  in  the  case  this  possible  tariff  was  applied  as  
long  as   they  complied  with   the  new  established   issues  of   limiting   their   imported  quantity  or  
value  of  imported  goods.  Under  the  new  rules,  only  cars  whose  content  is  produced  in  the  Us  
by  at  least  a  75  percent  would  be  exempt  of  any  tariff,  while  the  current  level  is  at  62.5  percent  
(Schott,  2018b).  There  has  been  no  more  progress  on  this  side  of  the  trade  war  since  on  May  
17,   2019,  when  Trump   decided   to   delay   the   decision   on   the   imposition   of   auto   tariffs   and  
possible  export  restraints  to  EU  and  Japan  exports  to  the  US.  
In  view  of   recent  events  concerning  Mexico  migration,  a  new   front  has   just  opened  on   the  
battlefield  of  this  trade  war.  In  chapter  2,  the  issue  regarding  the  building  of  a  US-­Mexico  wall  
planned   by   Trump   was   very   briefly   discussed,   as   even   though   it   was   one   of   his   populist  
measures,   it   was   not   expected   to   have   an   actual   economic   impact   in   the   field   of   trade.  
Surprisingly,  on  May  30,  2019,  same  day  in  which  the  Trump  administration  officially  ordered  
to   start   the   process   of   approving   the   USCMA,   Donald   Trump   announced   his   intention   of  
imposing  5  percent  tariffs  on  all  Mexico  exports  to  the  US.  With  that,  Trump  invoked  the  1977  
International   Emergency   Economic   Powers   Act   (IEEPA).   This   law   “provides   the   President  
broad   authority   to   regulate   a   variety   of   economic   transactions   following   a   declaration   of  
national  emergency”  (Casey  et  al.,  2019).  
This  tariff  was  to  come  into  force  on  June  10,  2019,  with  the  main  objective  of  addressing  the  




Source:  Donald  Trump’s  Twitter  account  (2019)  
With  that,  he  ceased  the  imposition  of  the  tariff  that  would  have  had  an  effect  on  approximately  
$350   billion   US   imports   from   Mexico,   which   would   have   increased   the   tension   between  
countries  and  would  have  harmed  their  trade  relations.  
To  sum  up,  Trump  has  been  using  different  trade  instruments  to  ensure  that  “US  wins”.  By  so  
doing,   the   US   has   raised   tariffs,   established   quotas   and   even   trade   policy   to   pursue  
immigration  policy  objectives.  It  is  not  surprising  that  there  is  agreement  among  observers  that  
the  US  trade  policy  under  Trump  has  shifted  towards  protectionism.    
3.3.  Hypothesis  testing  
To  determine  whether  the  hypothesis  that  Trump  protectionism  is  having  a  negative  impact  on  
international  business  can  be  rejected,  this  research  carries  out  a  review  of  the  literature  on  
the   impact  of  Trump  economic  policies  on   international  business.  A   review  of   the   literature  
implies  the  review  of  current  knowledge  with  the  aim  of  improving  and  organizing  the  already  
existing  information  on  the  field  of  research,  and  identifying  areas  where  further  research  is  
needed,  either  because  there   is   lack  of  data  or   it   is  a   topic  uncovered  (Webster  &  Watson,  
2002).  Due  to  time  and  resources  constraints,  the  data  for  the  review  of  the  literature  mainly  
comes   from  a   single  database:   articles   from  Peterson   Institute   for   International  Economics  
(PIIE),  a  North  American  think  tank,  pro-­trade  and  specialized  in  international  economic  policy.  
Its  focus  on  international  economic  policy  ensures  the  following  up  of  Trump  policies  as  well  
as  an  interest  on  their  economic  impact  from  an  international  perspective.  Its  pro-­trade  stance  
ensures  a  critical  perspective  and  therefore  prevents  a  pro-­Trump  diatribe.  Moreover,   if   the  
articles  from  such  a  think  tank  consider  that  Trump’s  policies  have  had  a  positive  net  effect  on  
international   business,   one   could   assume   that   this   research   hypothesis   can   be   rejected.  
Additionally,  I  will  use  some  other  articles  to  explain  in  greater  detail  the  subject  matter.  
To  select  the  articles,  several  searches  were  carried  out  in  the  PIIE  database  of  publications.  
Since  international  business  is  directly  linked  to  trade  and  investment,  the  key  words  used  in  
the  searches  were:  “Trump  trade  and  investment”  and  “Trump  FDI”.  The  first  search  produced  
292  results,  and  the  second  one  14  articles.  Due  to  lack  of  time  and  space,  the  analysis  carried  
out   in   this  has  been  based  on  articles  covering  the  trade  wars  declared  by  Trump  since  he  
entered   into  the  US  government.  The  articles  were  selected  taking   into  account   the  year  of  
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publication  as  well  as  the  focus  of  the  article.  Regarding  the  former,  the  selection  has  favored  
the  more  recent  articles,  those  published  not  earlier  than  a  year  and  half  ago,  early  2018,  for  
two  reasons:  for  the  research  to  be  as  updated  as  possible  yet  also  because  PIIE  publications  
build  up  one  from  the  other  so  that  the  latest  publications  are  expected  to  take  into  account  
previous  publication  on  the  subject  covered  by  the  article.  As  to  the  focus  of  the  article,  the  
selection  has  favored  those  publications  dealing  with  the  impact  on  trade  of  deals  with  third  
countries,  general  effects  caused  by  already  imposed  tariffs  and  quotas  and  foreign  investment  
in  the  US.  The  objective  was  to  select  articles  that  covered  the  impact  of  as  much  of  the  trade  
wars  described  in  the  previous  section  as  possible.  
The  research  sets  its  roots  on  the  article  “Trump’s  Trade  War  Timeline:  An  Up-­to-­Date  Guide”  
(Bown  &  Kolb,  2019),  which  provides  a  historical  framework  of  all  Trump’s  trade  battles.  This  
article  together  with  others  that  cover  all  trade  war  battles  have  the  main  goal  of  determining  
the  impact  on  international  business  of  the  trade  wars  explained  in  the  previous  section  and  
summarized  in  Table  3.  Has  the  impact  of  all  these  trade  wars  been  negative?  
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migration  coming  
from  the  US-­Mexico  
border  
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Source:  Based  on  article  “Trump’s  Trade  War  Timeline:  An  Up-­to-­Date  Guide”  (2019)  
                                                   
1  Information  taken  from  “China  retaliatory  tariffs  on  US  goods  come  into  force”  (Srinivas  &  Pandey,  2019)  
2  Data  found  on  “The  US-­China  Trade  War:  A  Timeline”  (Wong  &  Koty,  2019)  
3  Information  acquired  from  “China  rare  earth  prices  soar  on  their  potential  role  in  trade  war”  (Daly  &  Singh,  2019)  
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3.4.  Conclusion  
The  main  object  of  this  research  paper  is  to  find  out  whether  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  has  
had   effects   on   international   business.   The   suggested   hypothesis   alleges   that   populism  
followed  by  Donald  Trump  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  international  business,  upholding  that  
Trump   is   a   populist   figure   who   has   followed   trade   protectionism,   which   economic   theory  
expects  to  have  adverse  effects  in  international  business.  To  test  the  hypothesis,  I  propose  to  
carry  out  a  literature  review  on  this  topic.  The  core  of  the  analysis  is  to  assess  the  impact  of  
the  trade  wars  presented  above  in  table  3.  This  is  be  done  with  the  help  of  several  PIIE  articles,  
together  with  some  additional  ones  to  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  trade  war’s  effects.  
By  identifying  the  type  of  impact  and  whether  the  impact  positive  or  negative  for  international  
business,  it  will  be  shown  if  the  hypothesis  can  be  rejected  or  not.  
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4.   RESULTS  
This  chapter  carries  out  a  literature  review  on  the  impact  of  Trump’s  populism  on  international  
business  with  the  main  goal  of  establishing  whether  Donald  Trump’s  policies  have  negatively  
affected   international   business   or   not.   To   that   end,   secondary   sources   are   analyzed   to  
establish   the   consequences   of   Trump’s   trade   wars   and   the   reasons   behind   those  
consequences  will  be  analyzed.  The  chapter  is  divided  in  six  sections.  Besides  the  conclusion,  
each   of   the   other   five   sections   corresponds   to   one   of   the   trade   wars   initiated   by   the   US  
Administration  since  2017.  
4.1.  Trade  war  #1:  Solar  panels  and  washing  machines  
Solar  panels  and  washing  machines  trade  war  was  the  first  one  in  the  set  of  Trump’s  trade  
wars.  The  beginning  of  this  war  goes  back  to  January  2018,  when  President  Donald  Trump  
announced  the  imposition  of  global  safeguard  tariffs  on  8.5  billion-­dollar  imported  solar  panels  
and  1.8  billions  of  dollars  washing  machines  imports.  Despite  the  fact  that  member  states  of  
the  WTO  are  allowed  to  establish   tariffs  and  quotas   to  safeguard   their  domestic  production  
when  their  domestic  producers  are  suffering  serious  injury  due  to  an  increase  in  imports  under  
certain  circumstances,  it  is  a  protectionist  measure.  South  Korea  filed  WTO  disputes  alleging  
that  the  safeguard  tariff  was  not  used  correctly  and  neither  was  fair.  China,  in  its  part,  retaliated  
economically  by  targeting  $1  billion  of  US  sorghum  exports  with  tariffs,  although  later  lifted  this  
imposition  during   its  negotiations  with   the  US  regarding  another   trade  war.  Even  so,  China  
also   filed   a   WTO   dispute   claiming   the   existence   of   an   unfair   safeguard   tariffs   imposition  
followed  by  Trump  (Bown  &  Colb,  2019).  
This  trade  war  has  not  been  the  subject  of  many  articles  in  PIIE.  This  is  probably  due  to  the  
fact  that  safeguard  tariffs  are  a  normal  WTO  measure,  and  although  they  have  an  economic  
impact,   they   are   not   supposed   to   affect   too  much   international   business.   It   has   of   course  
affected  US  sorghum  imports  and  has  led  to  the  reduction  of  trade  in  washing  machines  and  
solar  panels  between  the  US  and  the  rest  of  the  world,  but  these  protectionist  measures  did  
not  cause  too  much  uncertainty  in  the  field  of  international  business  (Bown,  2018).  The  tariff  
on  sorghum  imports  was  removed  quite  quickly  by  China,  and  the  safeguards  imposed  by  the  
US  government  are  known   to  be   temporary,  since  WTO  rules  establish   temporary   limits   to  
them.   Bown   and   Zhang   (2018)   considered,   however,   that   all   events   during   this   short   but  
intense   battle   were   a   prelude   of   what   was   coming.   This   trade   war   was   also   one   of   the  
foundations   of   what   is   currently   the   US-­China   trade   war,   whose   effects   have   been   really  
harmful  on  international  business,  as  will  be  further  explained  on  the  next  sections.  
4.2.  Trade  war  #2:  Steel  and  aluminum    
Regarding  steel  and  aluminum  trade  war,  it  started  with  a  National  Security  investigation  that  
resulted  in  tariffs  on  a  third  of  US  steel  imports  and  45  percent  of  aluminum  imports.  Originally,  
the  EU,  Canada,  Mexico,  Brazil  and  several  more  countries  were  exempt,  while  China  was  
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not.  Later  on  time,  the  EU,  Canada  and  Mexico  also  stopped  being  exempt  and  together  with  
India,  China  and  Turkey,  retaliated  against  US  exports,  mostly  agricultural  ones.  
As   expected, As   expected,   this   trade   war   has   affected   international   business.   Foreign  
retaliation   has   resulted   in   a   12   billion-­dollar   subsidy   to   soybean   farmers   from   the   US  
government,  as  64  percent  of   total  US  exports  soybeans  have  been  affected  by   retaliatory  
tariffs.  In  this  case,  US  is  providing  monetary  facilities  to  trade  to  a  specific  sector,  which  is  a  
protectionist  measure.  Moreover,  US  tariffs  have  negatively  affected  US  companies  that  buy  
those  materials  from  foreign  companies.  Following  Keynes  and  Bown  (2019a),  tariffs  on  steel  
and  aluminum  were  aimed  to  restrict  overseas  metal  imports,  and  through  that,  to  directly  help  
domestic  steel  and  aluminum  sectors.  The  problem  is  that  none  of  other  sectors  or  consumers  
were   borne   in   mind   when   tariffs   were   imposed.   As   Schott   (2019)   put   it:   “a   few   US   steel  
companies  and  their  workers  have  benefited  from  the  new  protectionist  measures,  but  many  
have  been  hurt  by  higher  input  costs  and  lost  sales  abroad  due  to  tit-­for-­tat  retaliation”  (para.  
10).    
David  Weinstein  from  Columbia  University  explains  why  this  happens  (in  Keynes  and  Bown,  
2019a).   US   firms   used   to   buy   raw   materials,   such   as   steel   and   aluminum,   from   foreign  
intermediaries.  In  light  of  tariffs  imposition  and  subsequent  increase  on  prices,  US  producers  
started  to  use  lower  quality  inputs.  This  implied  a  loss  on  producers’  competitiveness  due  to  
higher  costs  on   foreign   input  materials,  and   thereby,   they  begin   to  put   in   the  market   lower  
quality   products,   which   directly   affects   consumers.   In   the   case   they   kept   using   foreign  
materials,  US  firms  would  have  higher  production  costs  to  deal  with  as  domestic  demand  of  
materials  went  up,  so  new  price  is  most  of  the  time  transferred  to  consumers.  Thus,  whether  
US  producers  kept  using  foreign  materials  or  started  to  use  domestic  inputs,  either  domestic  
consumers  or  producers  get  worse  off  with  steel  and  aluminum  tariffs.  As  foreign  competitors  
had  to  face  new  tariffs,  US  firms  were  able  to  raise  their  prices  and  still  get  price-­advantaged.  
Regarding  that,  statistics  show  that  US  companies  increased  its  prices  up  to  1.1  percent  and  
that  foreign  imports  to  US  in  targeted  sectors  had  dropped  by  5  percent  relative  to  untargeted  
sectors,  which  has  resulted  in  an  impact  on  the  US  supply  chain  network,  as  firms  were  having  
difficulties  to  find  new  sources  of  supply.  
More  importantly,  these  measures  may  have  been  politically  rather  than  trade  motivated.  Amit  
Khandelwal   from   Columbia   Business   School   (in   Keynes   and   Bown,   2019a)   finds   that  
determined  US  tariffs  were  imposed  to  protect  a  specific  region  of  voters,  composed  by  States  
such  as  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  Wisconsin…  what   is  known  as   the   “rasp  belt”  of   the  US,  who  
indeed  benefitted   from  the  tariff.  This  showed  that,   to  a  certain  extent,  Trump  had   imposed  
those   tariffs   in   a   political-­oriented   vision,   which   damages   the  whole   international   business  
context   and   gives   rise   to   concerns   that   Donald   Trump   could   be   carrying   out   unfair   trade  
practices  for  political  reasons.  The  WTO  allows  its  members  to  raise  tariffs  above  the  so-­called  
bound   tariffs   or   to   do   it   in   a   discriminatory   way   through   its   Article   XXI.   Nevertheless,   this  
exemption  (contrary  to  safeguards)  has  almost  never  been  used  because  it  is  considered  as  
a  measure  of  last  resort.  In  fact,  it  had  previously  just  been  used  by  WTO  members  in  cases  
of  war.  
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Unlike  for  the  solar  panels  and  washing  machines  trade  war,  and  in  light  of  a  larger  worldwide  
impact,  there  are  many  more  articles  covering  this  trade  war.  This  suggests  that  there  is  much  
more   concern   towards   this   battle.   The   explanation   for   that   relies   on   issues   previously  
explained.  Steel  and  aluminum  tariffs  and  subsequent  actions  taken  by  both  China  and  US  
have  had  an  impact  over  trade  and  investment,  but  also  have  increased  uncertainty  over  which  
are  the  rules  for  trade  affecting  companies’  strategic  decisions.      
4.3.  Trade  war  #3:  Technology  and  intellectual  property  unfair  trade  practices  
Technology  and  intellectual  property  unfair  trade  practices  trade  war  is  one  of  the  most  known  
US   trade   wars.   As   explained   in   the   previous   chapter,   it   started   with   a   National   Security  
investigation  on  China’s  trade  practices  and  led  to  the  raising  of  tariffs  on  46.2  billion  dollars  of  
Chinese   products.   In   response   to   that,   China   retaliated   and   also   imposed   tariffs   on   US  
products.  US-­China  spiral  of  retaliations  was  the  trigger  of  what  we  know  today  as  the  US-­
China  trade  war,  which  some  even  begin  to  call  the  “new  Cold  War”.  
Bolt,  Mavromatis,  and  Van  Wijnbergen   (2019)  show   that  such   trade  wars  not  only  have  an  
impact   on   business   in   China   and   the   US,   but   also   in   third   countries.   They   assessed   the  
macroeconomic  effects  of   the  US-­China   trade  war  on   the  Euro  Area  through  EAGLE  (Euro  
Area  and  Global  Economy)  which  consists  in  “an  open  economy  DSGE  model  that  account  for  
international   macroeconomic   interdependence   –   within   the   euro   area,   but   also   globally”  
(Gomes  as  cited  in  Bolt  et  al.,  2019,  para.  3).  Findings  of  the  analysis  show  that  the  euro  area  
could  actually  profit  from  the  trade  war  as  they  receive  cheaper  imports  from  China,  those  that  
were  supposed  to  go  to  the  US,  and  also  benefits  from  US  firms’  decreased  competitiveness  
in  response  to  tariffs  and  appreciating  dollar.  Nevertheless,  all  those  benefits  are  in  the  short-­
run,  and  the  final  global  impact  of  the  US-­China  trade  war  is  negative.  The  research  shows  
that   retaliatory   tariff   wars   lead   to   lower   output   in   the   long-­run   and   they   also   decrease  
consumption  and  investment  not  only  on  both  sides  of  the  trade  war  but  also  in  third  countries  
(including  the  Euro  Area).  
Moreover,  trade  wars  have  a  negative  impact  on  investment.  Schott  et  al.  (2019)  show  that  
Chinese  FDI  into  the  US  reached  its  peak  in  2015  and  then  started  to  drop  in  2016  reaching  
almost  zero  levels  in  2018  (see  Figure  1).  The  authors  consider  that  this  evolution  is  the  result  
of  both  the  national  security  investigation  on  China’s  trade  practices  and  the  new  US  legislation  







FIGURE  1.  PROGRESS  OF  FDI  FROM  CHINA  INTO  THE  UNITED  STATES  
  
Source:  Reprinted  from  “Investment  from  China  into  the  United  States  Has  Fallen  to  Nearly  Zero”  (2019)  
In  May  2019,  the  Chinese  enterprise  Huawei  was  added  to  the  US  “Entity  List”,  that  implied  a  
block   on   technology   sales   and   transfers   from   US   companies   to   Huawei.   In   regards   to  
international   business   impact,   clearly   Huawei   and   its   trading   partners   have   been   directly  
affected.   But,   apart   from   that,   this   action   has   caused   other   economic   reactions.   Ghaffary  
(2019)  has  explained   that   tariff   increases  have  also  affected  major  US   tech  companies,  as  
fraction  of  its  sales  depend  on  Chinese  consumer  market.  In  view  of  that,  Apple  will  have  to  
decide  whether  they  will  be  the  ones  to  deal  with  those  added  costs  or  they  will  transfer  it  to  
consumers  in  form  of  higher  prices.  Additionally,  rural  sector  of  US,  unexpectedly,  have  also  
been  adversely  affected  by  this  trade  war.  This  is  because  rural  carriers  depend  on  Huawei  
technology  to  “provide  cheaper  equipment  that  Western  manufacturers  can  offer”  (para.  24).  
Trade  barriers  to  China  have  not  just  been  in  the  form  of  tariffs:   investment  protection  rules  
have  also  been  used.  All   this  has   increased  uncertainty   for   international  business  over   the  
future,  since  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  Trump  administration  is  prepared  to  use  whatever  
measure  it  considers  necessary  whether  it  complies  with  WTO  rules  or  not.  
4.4.  Trade  war  #4:  Car  industry  
Car  industry  trade  war  consists  basically  on  duties  on  all  US  imports  of  automobiles  and  auto  
parts.   It  was  supposed   to  mainly  affect  EU  (mostly  Germany  and  United  Kingdom),  Japan,  
Canada  and  Mexico,  although  the  latter  two  would  be  exempt  with  the  USMCA  signing.  This  
trade  war  is  temporarily  on  hold  due  to  Trump’s  pending  decision  on  tariffs  imposition.  
One  of  the  effects  this  trade  war  would  have  is  related  to  Japan’s  business.  Japan  was  the  
third  biggest  autos  and  parts  exporter  to  the  US  in  2018  and  has  a  bilateral  trade  surplus  with  
the  US.  This   ensures   a   highly   competitive  US  auto  market.  Also,   Japanese   car   producers  
largely  invest  in  US-­based  production.  FDI  from  Japan  has  grown  from  $6.2  billion  in  1990  to  
$42.1  billion  in  2017.  All  this  makes  Japan  the  country  most  prone  to  get  adversely  affected  by  
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an  imposition  of  tariffs  on  US  auto  and  parts  imports,  as  it  would  not  only  break  in  on  trade  but  
also  would  cause  confusion  over  both  investment  and  production  of  Japan  in  the  US  (Hufbauer  
&  Jung,  2019).  Main  cost  of  this  trade  war  would  be  in  the  form  of  uncertainty  for  international  
business,  since  Japan  is  a  very  important  trading  partner  to  the  US  due  to  the  high  level  of  
trade  and   investments  between   the  US  and  Japan.   If  US-­Japan   trade  relations  deteriorate,  
international  business  field  would  be  affected.    
Schott  (2019)  wrote  his  suppositions  on  how  the  auto  industry  trade  war  could  generally  harm  
international  business  if  National  Security  Investigation  findings  led  to  an  increase  in  protection  
without   rules   regarding  period  of   time  and   targets  of   the   imposition   (thereby,  different   from  
safeguards).   On   the   domestic   side,   US   production   of   vehicles   would   get   more   expensive  
caused  by  rise   in  prices  of  necessary   inputs,  which  would   result   in  higher  consumer  prices  
and/or  reduced  corporate  profits.  At  the  same  time,  already  high  production  costs  due  to  steel  
and   aluminum   tariffs   are   putting   at   risk   US   auto   industry   output   and   employment.   On   the  
foreign  side,  apart  from  the  actual  imposition  of  the  tariff  that  would  increase  export  costs  and  
US   imports  price,   foreign   investment   into   the  US  would  decrease  due   to  higher  production  
costs  and  larger  difficulties  to  export.  Furthermore,  by  applying  this  kind  of  tariffs,  Trump  would  
be  fostering  a  less  competitive  US  auto  industry,  together  with  a  decrease  on  investment  in  
US  plants  and  a  loss  on  jobs  in  the  US  sector.    
In  sum,  again  the  expected  consequences  of  trade  war  are  not  really  positive,  not  even  for  the  
car  industry  located  in  the  US.  While  their  cars  would  be  protected  from  external  competition,  
prices  of  inputs  will  go  up  and  investment  down.  Most  importantly,  such  a  trade  war,  based  on  
spurious  trade  reasons  would  not  help  decrease  uncertainty.      
4.5.  Trade  war  #5:  Mexico  migration  
Most  recent  trade  war  concerns  Mexico  migration.  Trump  intended  to  impose  a  5%  tariff  on  all  
US   imports   from   Mexico   to   address   the   illegal   migration   passing   through   the   US-­Mexico  
border.  Despite  the  fact  that  countries  reached  an  agreement,  the  origination  of  this  trade  war  
has  caught  by  surprise  rest  of  the  world  and  has  actually  had  a  global  impact.  
Keynes   and   Bown   (2019b)   discussed   about   the   likely   economic   impact   of   the   US-­Mexico  
border  issue  trade  war.  In  the  first  place  and  as  a  very  accurate  assumption,  trade  between  
US  and  Mexico  would  definitely  decrease.  As  in  the  previous  trade  wars,  consumer  products  
would  be  directly  hit  by  the  tariff,  which  would  have  an  immediate  impact  on  consumers,  but  
on  a  larger  extent  than  normally  would  occur,  as  many  Mexican  goods  are  imported  into  the  
US,  and  the  tariff  would  affect  all  kind  of  imports.  Also,  approximately  a  30  percent  of  Mexican  
goods  use  US  components  in  their  production,  and  with  the  tariff   their   final  value  would  get  
increase   on   a   great   level,   thereby,   a   greater   price   to   pay   for   consumers.   Moreover,   US  
domestic  economy  would  also  get  adversely  affected  because  US  firms  use  Mexican  inputs  
for  production  too,  especially  in  areas  like  Texas,  Michigan  and  upper  Midwest,  that  rely  on  
trade  with  Mexico,  specifically  in  the  auto  industry.  It   is  also  important  to  consider  monetary  
impact  because,  even  if  exchange  rates  cannot  predict  the  exact  impact  it  would  have,  most  
of  the  international  trade  is  invoiced  in  dollars,  so  it  would  definitely  affect  worldwide  business  
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if  dollar  was   to  get   revalued.  For  his  part,  Posen  (2019)  expressed  his  expectations  on   the  
macroeconomic  impact  this  announcement  is  likely  to  have  even  though  the  tariff  has  not  been  
imposed.  He  guesses  that  there  is  going  be  a  significant  drop  in  equity  market  and  a  worsening  
of   productive   foreign   investment   (including   US   investments),   and   that   companies   will   be  
looking  for  alternatives  to  “locate  their  headquarters  and  production  activity  –  and  erode  the  
US  tax  base”  (para.  7).  
Regardless   the  actual   tariff  enforcement,   the  mere  origination  of   this   trade  war  has  alerted  
international   countries   because   Donald   Trump   has   utilized   a   trade   policy   for   a   non-­trade  
purpose.  The  announcement  of   this   tariff   reduces  actual  possibilities  of   the  approval  of   the  
USMCA   free   trade   agreement.   Even   if   this   trade   war   has   temporarily   been   postponed,   it  
definitely  has  had  its  own  impact  on  international  business,  as  it  has  started  to  spread  anxiety  
at   the   possibility   of,   just   as   Trump   has   done,   using   non-­trade   arguments   to   engage   in  
protectionism.  In  view  of  this  specific  trade  war  events,  uncertainty  for  international  business  
has  heavily  increased  because  US  economy  has  stopped  to  be  considered  as  one  of  the  most  
stable   economies  worldwide,   and   companies   are   looking   for   other   nations  with  more   solid  
economies  in  which  establish  themselves.  This  all  comes  with  the  reasoning  that  Trump  has  
clearly  demonstrated  that  he  can  take  decisions  that  are  over  the  rules  for  political  purposes.  
4.6.  Conclusion  
Analyzing  the  five  trade  wars,  a  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from  it.  All  the  trade  wars  have  led  
to  an  increase  in  protection  and  retaliation.  Nonetheless,  there  are  a  few  trade  wars  that  PIIE  
observers  and  analysts  are  more  concerned  about.  These  trade  wars  are  the  ones  that  allow  
protection  measures  to  be  determined  by  political  decisions  taken  by  Trump  Administration.  
This  implies  that  instead  of  establishing  clear  rules  on  the  time  span  of  the  protection  measure  
or  on  the  discrimination  between  countries  that  it  is  allowed,  these  measures  do  not  follow  any  
kind  of   rules  and,   thereby,   lead   to  a  higher   level  of  uncertainty.   In   light  of   tariffs  and  other  
protectionist  measures  applied  during  the  trade  wars  as  well  as  the  attached  uncertainty  for  
international  business,  further  drops  in  trade  and  investment  levels  are  expected.  For  all  these  
reasons,  while   Trump   protectionism  may   be   beneficial   for   some   domestic   companies,   it   is  
damaging  international  business.       
 33  
5.   CONCLUSIONS  
The  aim  of  the  present  research  was  to  determine  if  Donald  Trump’s  brand  of  populism  has  
had  a  negative  impact  on  international  business.  The  hypothesis  was  that  this  is  the  case  for  
two   reasons.   The   first   reason   is   that   Trump   can   be   considered   a   populist   and   his   policies  
include  protectionist  measures.  The  second  reason  is  that  following  classical  economic  theory,  
protectionists  policies  are  expected  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  international  business.    
The  research  shows  that  Trump’s  special  brand  of  populism  has  led  the  US  to  start  different  
trade  wars.  Following  a  literature  review  of  PIIE  publications  on  the  details  and  impact  of  these,  
trade  wars  indicate  that  the  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected.  While  Donald  Trump  actions  have  
had  positive   impacts  on  several  domestic  businesses,   the   impact  on   international  business  
has  been  negative.  The  US  may  have  imposed  tariffs  with  a  valid  argument  or  not,  and  in  a  
degree  of  fair  trade  practice  or  not,  but  what  is  clear  is  that  these  actions  in  conjunction  with  
retaliation  have  not  had  good  impact  on  the  economy,  which,  ultimately,  affects  international  
business.  This  issue  refers  to  producers  and  consumers,  both  domestic  and  foreigners,  who  
have  been  the  ones  bearing  the  cost  of  the  imposed  tariffs.  Here  is  how  it  works.  In  light  of  
restrictions  on  imports,  US  producers  in  need  of  foreign  input  have  had  to  act  upon  the  tariff  
imposition.  An  option  was  to  keep  buying  foreign  materials,  but  now  for  a  higher  price.  This  
could  result  in  either  a  higher  price  to  consumers  or  lesser  profits  for  the  company.  To  avoid  
this   situation,   another   option  was   to   start   buying   lower   quality   inputs,   which   is   harmful   for  
consumers   because   a   noxious   product   would   be   place   in   the   market.   Those   domestic  
businesses  that  were  not  targeted  by  tariffs  had  an  advantage  over  those  actually  targeted,  
and   this  could   lead   to  a   loss   in  competitiveness  and,  at   the  same  time,  a   raise   in  prices  of  
products,  which  is  an  unfair  trade  practice.  Foreign  producers  would  have  to  face  the  new  tariff  
and  would  be  worse  off  in  relation  to  domestic  ones.    
The   literature   review   also   indicates   that   some   trade   wars   have   had   more   impact   on   the  
international  field  than  others.  The  most  negative  trade  wars  are  the  ones  that  have  involved  
National  Security  Investigations.  While  members  of  the  WTO  are  allowed  to  protect  themselves  
if   their   national   security   is  affected  by   trade,   this  exception   to  WTO  normal   rules   implies  a  
degree  of  flexibility  in  the  application  of  protectionist  measures  that  are  usually  reserved  to  war  
situations.  This  is  because  this  exception  does  not  establish  any  kind  of  rules  in  regards  to  the  
validity  period  of  the  tariff  imposition  or  any  regulated  discrimination  between  countries.  Such  
flexibility  leads  to  an  environment  of  uncertainty  for  international  business.  The  literature  review  
indicates   that   after   seeing   Trump   applying   trade   policies   with   political-­oriented   arguments,  
companies  are  starting  to  worry  about  future  expectations  on  US  trade  actions  and  are  thinking  
on   establishing   in   different   regions   to   avoid   sudden   US   tariff   impositions.   This   issue   also  
involves  FDI,  as  foreign  investment  into  the  US  is  expected  to  decrease  for  the  same  reason  




Having  said  that,  it  is  here  we  think  on  the  future  and  ask  ourselves:  what  is  next?  There  is  an  
issue  of  Trump’s  way  of  applying  protectionism  that  is  causing  worry  and  anxiety:  the  fact  that  
US-­China  trade  war  can  really  become  the  new  Cold  War.  Up  to  now,  no  important  figure  has  
clearly  announced  that,  but  analysts,  observers  and  journalists  are  starting  to  call  it  as  the  new  
Cold  War,  and,  truth  to  be  told,  there  are  very  few  steps  to  lose  control  over  this  trade  war  and  
that   it  gets  out  of  hand.  What   is  surprising   is   that   the   fact   that  US   trade  wars   involve  most  
countries  over  the  world,  Trump  attacks  both  foes  and  allies.  This  may  lead  to  the  creation  of  
unexpected   alliances,   such   as   China   and   the   European   Union   to   save   the   WTO.   These  
alliances  would  have  never  been  imagined  if  it  was  not  for  the  consequences  Trump’s  trade  
wars  have  had  on  them.  We  will  have  to  keep  updated  on  the  next  US  moves  in  the  business  
framework,  and  hope  that,  at  some  point,  Trump  stop  taking  political-­oriented  decisions  and  
that  with  this,  international  business  world  get  to  cool  off  and  return  the  peace  between  national  
economies.     
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